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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL, WAIVER THEREOF, AND
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN
CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS
by
John I. Brunetti*

C

ONSIDERATION of the rights of mental patients has become an area of
increasing concern to the legal community. Establishing a constitutional
right to treatment for committed persons has been the paramount concern of
mental health advocates and commentators during this period, and that
concern was focused in O'Connor v. Donaldson," recently decided by the
United States Supreme Court. With regard to legal representation at the
commitment stage, however, the emphasis has been on defining counsel's
role 2 rather than on considering the more fundamental question of whether a
constitutional right to appointed counsel exists in such proceedings. One
might properly construe this preoccupation with counsel's role prior to
establishing the right to counsel's presence as a philosophical placing of the
cart before the horse. This Article seeks to explore the right to counsel in
3
civil commitment proceedings.
Three issues regarding counsel in civil commitment proceedings will be
examined: whether the constitution provides for a right to appointed counsel
for indigent persons facing commitment, under what circumstances the right
may be waived, and what constitutes effective assistance of counsel in this
context. In each of these areas, an analysis of the applicable statutory
provisions of the fifty states and the District of Columbia will be set forth.
Case law and constitutional principles will then be considered so that the
statutory picture in the United States may be evaluated and so that the
various proposals may be critically analyzed.
I.

THE CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCESS

Essential to an understanding of the various aspects of the right to counsel
in civil commitment proceedings is a minimal familiarity with the process
*
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1. 95 S. Ct. 2486, 45 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1975). The final Donaldson case, as decided

by the Court, was a disappointment when compared to the circuit court's opinion, 493
F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), which expressly recognized a constitutional right to treatment
for nondangerous, involuntarily committed patients. The Supreme Court held only that
confinement of the harmless mentally ill was not warranted, and expressly reserved
judgment on the right to treatment issue.
2. See, e.g., Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the
Mentally Ill, 44 TEXAS L. Rav. 424 (1965); Litwack, The Role of Counsel in Civil
Commitment Proceedings: Emerging Problems, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 816 (1974).
3. The author of the most recent casebook in the area of psychiatry and mental
health has noted that this is an area which has received little consideration from the
commentators. A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 801
(1974).
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itself. A brief description of "how the system works" is, therefore, an
appropriate starting point.
A. Initiation
Not unlike the procedure in the criminal justice system, commitment
proceedings are triggered by one citizen's abnormal or antisocial act or
course of conduct, which causes another person to initiate commitment
proceedings, or to refer the proposed patient to an agency which will do so.
Whether it be a relative, a police officer, or a stranger whom the allegedly ill
person has annoyed or harmed, one citizen is requesting that the sovereign
exercise its authority over the person of another.
The invocation of the state's power may be supported by one or both of
two concepts. 4 The parens patriae power of the state may be employed to
confine the individual so that he does not harm himself, and so that his
malady may be treated. 5 The police power of the state, on the other hand,
may be exercised to confine the individual so as to prevent him from
harming other members of society. In effect, this two-pronged analysis of the
sovereign's authority has been codified into the most common statutory
standard which must be met before a court will civilly commit a person:
likelihood of doing harm to self or others. 6 That standard, and the others
used in a minority of American jurisdictions, 7 share two common characteristics: lack of precision and ambiguity. The presence of 1hose two factors
graphically demonstrates the necessity for an attorney in commitment cases,
for only a trained advocate could protect the person against whom commitment is sought by insuring that the substantive standard for commitability in
the particular jurisdiction is met, and if necessary, by challenging the statute
as unconstitutional on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth. This Article is
concerned with the procedure by which that standard is sought to be met,
and with the need for effective legal representation, provided at the state's
expense, within such a process.
B. Notice and Hearing
The procedural steps leading to commitment are similar among the
American jurisdictions. The patient, usually in some form of custody pur4. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 2494, 45 L. Ed. 2d 396, 407
(1975). See also Kutner, The Illusion of Due Process in Civil Commitment Proceedings,
57 Nw. U.L. REV. 383, 393-94 (1962).
5. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 45 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1975), which

established that the confinement of non-dangerous individuals who are capable of
surviving safely in everyday society, without more, is unconstitutional.
6. See S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 72 (2d ed.
1971) for a chart which reveals this standard to be employed in a majority of American
jurisdictions. Examples of other standards utilized are: for his own or others' welfare,

ALA. CODE tit. 45, § 205 (1959); incapable of caring for physical health and safety, GA.
CODE ANN.

§§ 88-505.2(a)(2)

MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.

(1971); mentally ill and likely to cause serious harm,

ch. 123, § 8(c) (1972).

In Texas, the judge or jury must determine that the proposed patient is both mentally
ill and requires hospitalization for his own welfare and protection or for the protection of
others before an order of indefinite commitment may be entered. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. arts. 5547-51(a), (b) (1958).

7. See S.

BRAKEL

& R. ROCK, supra note 6, at 72.
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suant to an emergency detention order, is examined by one or two physicians. If the physician(s) certify that commitment is warranted under the
applicable statute, the patient is notified orally and/or in writing of the
nature of the proceedings and a hearing date is set. The issue to be
determined at the hearing is whether the patient requires involuntary
hospitalization under the applicable statutory standard. The period of confinement may be temporary, that is, for a stated number of days; or it may
be final, for an indefinite time." This Article will focus on right to counsel
problems within the context of an indefinite commitment wherein the
individual is deprived of his liberty until such time as the state's physician
certifies that the patient no longer requires hospitalization. 9
C. Is a HearingConstitutionally Required?
This Article seeks to consider various aspects of the right to counsel in the
civil commitment process. Great emphasis will be placed on the hearing stage
of these proceedings in the pages that follow. It would, therefore, be
analytically unsound to summarily presume that a hearing is a constitutionally required element of these proceedings.
The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
no state shall deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law. Two
questions must be answered in the affirmative in order to find in this
mandate a constitutional right to a hearing in civil commitment proceedings.
First, is commitment for one's own good or the good of society a deprivation
of liberty within the due process clause? Second, is a hearing required before
such a commitment, or is an available post-commitment remedy such as a
writ of habeas corpus constitutionally sufficient?
As early as 1896 a Kansas court recognized that involuntary hospitalization is a deprivation of liberty, so that notice and the opportunity to be heard
are constitutionally required elements of due process. 10 As Justice Brandeis
cautioned us, "[e]xperience should leach us to be most on our guard to
protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent.""
The

Supreme Court adopted such reasoning in In re Gault1 2 when it character-

8. Compare TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-38(b) (1958), which permits
temporary confinement for up to 90 days of those certified by two physicians to be
mentally ill and in need of observation and/or treatment, with TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 5547-52(b) (1958), which permits indefinite commitment of those found to be
mentally ill or requiring hospitalization for their own welfare and protection, or that of
others. For temporary hospitalization, an application may be made by any adult person,
a hearing must be held within 14 days of the filing of the application, notice must be
given to the proposed patient, an attorney must be appointed if the proposed patient does

not have one, an informal hearing must be held which the proposed patient may attend,
and a jury trial may be demanded. The indefinite commitment procedure differs in the
following fundamental respects: no petition may be filed unless the person against whom
commitment is sought has been confined under a temporary hospitalization order for at
least 60 days within the last year, a hearing must be held within 30 days of the filing of
the petition, trial by jury may be waived only by a sworn writing, signed by the proposed
patient or next of kin and the attorney ad litem, and medical testimony is required as a
basis for commitment.
9. See, e.g., TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-80 (1958).

10. In re Wellman, 3 Kan. App. 100, 45 P. 726 (1896).
11. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
12. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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ized the commitment of juvenile delinquents for care and rehabilitation as a
deprivation of liberty within the protection of the due process clause. The
Court restated the fundamental view that due process is the "basic and
essential term in the social compact which defines the rights of the individual
and delimits the power which the state may exercise.' u 3 Since Gault held
that the exercise of the state's parens patriae power must conform to due
process when the commitment of a juvenile is sought, this reasoning logically
should apply to involuntary hospitalization of alleged mentally ill adults with
equal force.
Having concluded that civil commitment is a deprivation of liberty so as to
call for the application of procedural due process as a jurisdictional prerequisite, we must next determine if the Constitution mandates a pre-commitment
hearing as an essential element of due process. In other words, if the due
process clause applies, what sort of process is due the proposed patient?
It has been suggested that the availability of habeas corpus to a committed
person satisfies the due process requirement of "an opportunity to be
heard."'1 4 It has even been argued that the possible civil liability for
conspiring to commit a person that may be imposed upon the committing
physician is a cognizable element of protection.' 5 I would urge, however,
that neither habeas nor any other available remedy provides an adequate constitutional protection for the committed individual. These are afterthe-fact forms of relief which place an unfair burden of acting upon an
individual who, at the point in time where the remedy becomes available,
has already been adjudged mentally ill. Assuming that the individual is ill,
though he may not be properly hospitalized under the applicable statutory
standard, it is apparent that the availability of these remedies does not
constitute adequate protection.'
Much of the case law and commentary discussing habeas corpus as an
adequate remedy for judicial scrutiny of involuntary commitment came prior
to 1970, when the Supreme Court decided Goldberg v. Kelly.' 7 In Goldberg
the Court denounced as unconstitutional a procedure by which a hearing to
determine if welfare benefits should be terminated was held subsequent to
the termination. At first blush, Goldberg may seem tangential to a discussion
13. Id. at 20.
14. See, e.g., Hammon v. Hill, 228 F. 999 (W.D. Pa. 1915); R. FARMER, THE
OF THE MENTALLY ILL 6 (1967). See also Logan v. Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. 1265
(D. Conn. 1972), af'd mem. sub nom. Briggs v. Arafeh, 411 U.S. 911 (1973), which
upheld the Connecticut emergency commitment statute although such did not require a
prior judicial hearing, when the court stated that the availability of habeas corpus
protected the patient's rights although no statute required that the patient be specifically
informed of his right to file the writ. In Logan the court also drew the interesting
distinction between mental illness sufficient for hospitalization, and incompetency, under
which the patient would be presumed incapable of comprehending his legal rights. A
mere finding of the former would not be presumptive of the latter.
RImrrs

15. See M. GuirMAcHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 297 (1952).
16. See T. SZASZ, LAw, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY 297 (1963).

17. 377 U.S. 254 (1970). Despite what this author sees as its great ramifications for
judicial hearings in commitment cases, the Goldberg case has not received detailed
treatment by other commentators in the mental health field. See S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK,
supra note 6, at 52, where Goldberg was not even mentioned in a multi-paragraph
discussion of habeas corpus as a constitutionally sufficient substitute for a hearing.
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of the right to a hearing in civil commitment proceedings, but in-depth
consideration yields a common principle.
In Goldberg the Court initially had to determine if welfare benefits were
property within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. Having answered
that question in the affirmative, the Court next had to decide if due process
was satisfied by a post-termination hearing. The Court held the posttermination procedure to be unconstitutional. In analyzing this issue, the
Court engaged in a balancing process in which it weighed the threatened
harm to the public and consequent governmental interest in speedy, summary adjudication against the nature of the individual's right of which a
deprivation was sought. Because the Court deemed welfare to be the "means
for daily subsistence" for qualified applicants, 8 and its deprivation to
constitute a withdrawal of the essentials of existence, it concluded that
countervailing governmental interests in conserving fiscal and administrative
resources were not sufficient to justify the delay of a hearing until after the
discontinuance of welfare. Transformed to the civil commitment context, the
Goldberg reasoning would mandate a pre-commitment hearing. Surely the
deprivation of liberty which is inherent in commitment is at least as
important as is the deprivation of property rights in welfare assistance.
Although such a pre-commitment hearing may be required, however, it
should be pointed out that the Court in Goldberg stressed that the hearing
need not be a "judicial or quasi-judicial trial,"'1 9 but simply must serve to
determine the validity of the intended deprivation before it occurs. Therefore, although Goldberg stands for the proposition that the opportunity to be
heard is required by the due process clause, the Court did not reach the issue
of how formal the hearing must be, and what aspects of normal trial
procedure are applicable therein. It is those questions with which we will
now deal, in the particular areas of right to counsel, waiver, and effective
assistance of counsel in commitment proceedings.
II.

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS

Proceeding from the proposition that a pre-commitment hearing is constitutionally required in civil commitment proceedings, a consideration of the
right to counsel at such a hearing is the next step in this inquiry. It will be a
two-step analysis. First, a study of the nature of the statutory right to counsel
in fifty-one American jurisdictions will be offered. A discussion of practical
considerations and constitutional implications will follow.
A. The Statutory Right to Counsel
The statutory right in the United States jurisdictions to counsel at the
hearing stage may be broken down into several classifications. Some states
which statutorily mandate that the proposed patient be represented by
counsel at the hearing place a burden on the patient to affirmatively request
18. 397 U.S. at 264.
19. Id. at 266.
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that hearing. 20 For purposes of this grouping, it will be presumed that a
hearing is mandatory, or, if mandatory only on request of the person sought
to be committed, that he has made such a request.
Counsel Mandatory. Thirty-six jurisdictions mandate the appointment of
counsel for indigent persons facing an involuntary civil commitment hearing. 2' The language contained in these statutes is similar in whole or in part
to that suggested by the Draft Act: 22 "An opportunity to be represented by
counsel shall be afforded to every proposed patient, and if neither he nor
others provide counsel, the court shall appoint counsel. ' ' 23 Whatever language is used in the statutes in this group, the noted provisions contain
forceful terminology such as "must" or "shall appoint," leaving the presiding
judge with no discretion in the matter of appointing counsel for the indigent
subject in a pre-commitment hearing.
Counsel Discretionary. Nevada, New York, and Ohio statutorily provide
that the presiding judge "may" appoint counsel to represent the indigent
person at the commitment hearing. 24 If the patient appears acquiescent
during the proceedings, the judge may erroneously deduce that there is no
20. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 6-4 (Supp. 1975). These statutes will also
be discussed in the waiver context. See note 90 infra and accompanying text.
21. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.070(h) (1971); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-536
(1974); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5302 (West 1972) (appears discretionary by
requiring appointment "if need be" but later states that the court shall appoint where the
person is unable to obtain counsel); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-10-107(5) (1974);
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-178 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.16, § 5125(e)(1) (Supp.
1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-543 (1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467(3)(a) (Supp.
1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-505.3(a) (1971); IDAHO CODE § 66-329(e) (Supp. 1975);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 6-4 (1975); IND. CODE § 16-14-9-16 (1973) (requires the
appointment of the county prosecuting attorney to represent the proposed patient eligible
for commitment to a federally maintained institution and otherwise unrepresented by
counsel); IowA CODE § 229.5 (1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2914(C) (Supp. 1974);
KY. REV. STAT. § 202.136 (1972); LA. REV. STAT. § 28:53(A) (Supp. 1975); ME.REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 2334 (Supp. 1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 5 (Supp.
1974); MICH. COMp. LAws §§ 330.1450(3), .1454 (1975); MINN. STAT. § 253A.07(15)
(1971); MONT.REV. CODES ANN. § 38-1309(1) (Interim Supp. 1975); Mo.REV. STAT. §
202.807(4) (1972); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 135-B:5, :7 (Supp. 1973); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 34-2-5(F) (Interim Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN.STAT. § 122-58.7(c) (Supp. 1974);
ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 426.100(1)-(3) (1974); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 26-2-13 (1968);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-961 (Supp. 1974); S.D. CODE § 27-7-2.6 (Interim Supp. 1975);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-604(c) (Supp. 1974); TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-43
(1958); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-36(5) (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-67.1
(Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7111 (1968); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-5-4(c)

(Supp. 1975); Wyo. STAT. ANN.§ 25-60(g) (Supp. 1975). Admittedly, the categorization of these statutes is somewhat speculative because most have not yet been judicially
interpreted. Delaware and Michigan, for example, require that the proposed patient be
informed of his right to counsel, and might, therefore, be interpreted as making
appointment mandatory only upon request. See note 27 infra and accompanying text.
22.

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, A DRAFT

Acr GOVERmNG HOSPIrrALIzATIoN OF THE MENTALLY ILL (Public Service Pub. No. 51,
1952) [hereinafter cited as DRAFT ACT]. This Act was intended to serve as an aid for
states in revising their mental health laws. While it may have set a fine example for
establishing a right to counsel, the Act has fallen short in the areas of waiver and
effective assistance of counsel.
23. DRAFT ACT § 9(f). Presumably indigency would be the usual, though not
exclusive, reason why the proposed patient fails to provide counsel.
24. NEV. REV. STAT. § 433.693(1) (1973); N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 88(c)
(McKinney 1971); OHmO REV. CODE ANN § 5122.15 (Page 1970).
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need for counsel. 25 Such are the problems inherent in discretionary stat26
utes.
Counsel Mandatory on Request. Five states authorize their presiding judges
to appoint counsel for indigent patients upon their request. 27 Considering the
nature of the proceeding, the merit of this approach must be seriously
questioned. If the state is claiming that a person is incapable of caring for his
person or that he is so mentally unbalanced as to be considered potentially
dangerous, how can the state presume that he will be capable of protecting a
28
legal right?
Guardian Ad Litem (Attorney Mentioned). This type of statute provides
that a guardian ad litem be appointed to represent the proposed patient and
refers to attorneys only as members of the class from which a guardian may
be selected or as those who may appear under other circumstances (e.g., as
retained counsel). Hawaii and Wisconsin vest the judge with the discretion to
appoint a guardian ad litem who may be an attorney or any other responsible person. 20 This discretionary scheme should be contrasted with that in
Alabama, where the court is required to appoint a guardian whose statutory
duty is to employ counsel at the expense of the party for whom commitment
is sought. 30 No provision is made for impoverished persons. New Jersey
offers another type of statute which mentions counsel only in stating that a
patient confined in an institution prior to a judicial hearing should be
afforded every opportunity to appear personally or by an attorney if such a
hearing is to occur.3 1 Again, no provision for ,the appointment of counsel in
the case of indigent persons is statutorily mentioned.
Guardian Ad Litem (No Mention of Attorney). The three remaining
jurisdictions make no reference to the presence of a legally trained representative of the proposed patient at the commitment hearing, 32 but all provide
for the appointment of a guardian ad litem. The Arkansas statute is
especially objectionable. Indigents facing civil commitment have no statutory
right to counsel, but there has been statutory authorization for the appoint25. See Partridge, Constitutional Requirements in Involuntary Civil Commitment, 2
L.F. 89, 92 (1972), wherein the author notes that patients are often under sedation

MD.

during their hearings.
26. Cf. CAL. WELF. &

INST'NS CODE

§ 5302 (West 1972), which is here considered

mandatory, but which contains language which may cause it to be interpreted as
discretionary. See note 21 supra.
27. MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 13(c) (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-325.01 (1971);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-11(6) (1970); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 55 (Supp. 1974);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.200(1)(b) (1975).
28. But see Logan v. Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Conn. 1972), aff'd mem. sub
nom. Briggs v. Arafeh, 411 U.S. 911 (1973), where the court stated that mental illness
for purposes of hospitalization and incompetency to stand trial or to comprehend legal
rights are separate and independent concepts.
29. HAwAII REV. STAT. § 334-82 (1968); WIS. STAT. § 51.02(4) (1957).
30. ALA. CODE tit. 21, § 15 (1968).
31. N.J. REV. STAT. § 30:4-41 (Supp. 1975). But see dictum in McCorkle v. Smith,
100 N.J. Super. 595, 242 A.2d 861 (1968), to the effect that an attorney should be
provided in every judicial commitment proceeding.

32. ARK. STAT. ANN.
STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4406

§ 59-419 (1971); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-21-3 (1972); PA.
(1969).
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ment of counsel for indigents in ordinary civil law suits in Arkansas since
3
1931.3
The failure to provide for counsel in the Pennsylvania statute was held
constitutional by a state court in 1968 on the theory that civil commitment is
not criminal in nature since its purpose is to protect the mentally ill person
and society.3 4 That holding was strongly criticized three years later by a
federal court sitting in Pennsylvania, which held the provision unconstitutional on its face and ordered that counsel be appointed in all commitment
proceedings. 3 5 The Pennsylvania statute has remained conspicuously unchanged.
In summary, thirty-six jurisdictions provide for the mandatory appointment of counsel for the civil commitment hearing, five condition this
imperative upon the patient's request and three leave the appointment of
counsel within the "sound" discretion of the presiding judge. The remaining
seven states rely on guardians ad litem to protect the interests of proposed
patients, and make little or no reference to the presence of attorneys. Though
this statutory picture is not bleak, certain critical observations must be made.
A mere statutory right to counsel for indigent persons facing involuntary
commitment is an inadequate procedural protection. As has often been
demonstrated, whatever protection the legislature might give, it might also
take away. 30 The differing methods by which the various states provide for
the legal representation of indigent subjects of hospitalization proceedings
demonstrate the need for recognition of a constitutional imperative to create
uniformity and to insure that psychiatric justice is administered fairly
throughout the United States. The task is to find specific constitutional bases
for that imperative.
In Argersinger v. Hamlin3 7 the Supreme Court fashioned a rule to further
implement the constitutional right to counsel in criminal cases. The Court
ruled that no person could be sentenced to a prison term for any offense
unless he was represented by counsel, or unless after being advised of his
right to have counsel appointed, he knowingly waived that right. There are
three aspects to such a rule: the pure existence of the right, the manner in
which it is to be articulated to the person whom it is intended to protect, and,
once articulated, the circumstances under which it may be waived. These
factors take on great significance in the civil commitment context where,
assuming some validity to the claim of mental illness, the individual's ability
to understand may be severely impaired.
B. Developing a ConstitutionalRight to Counsel
in Commitment Proceedings

We must now shift our inquiry to a discussion of whether counsel at the
33. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-401 (1962).
34. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 211 Pa. Super. 349, 236 A.2d 558 (1967).
35. Dixon v. Commonwealth, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
36. See CAL. WELF. & INsT'Ns CODE § 5302 (West 1972), which prior to a 1967
amendment was much more direct and less ambiguous in requiring the judge to appoint
counsel.

37. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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constitutionally required pre-commitment hearing is also constitutionally
mandated. I would submit that the constitutional right to counsel therein has
its source in two independent concepts-in the sixth amendment as it is
made binding on the states by the fourteenth amendment,8 8 and in the
fourteenth amendment's general due process clause.
The Sixth Amendment. The sixth amendment to the Constitution provides in
part that "[ifn all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
. . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." 39 Despite this
express limitation to criminal prosecutions, a number of courts have found in
the sixth amendment a constitutional right to appointed counsel for indigent
persons facing involuntary commitment. 40 It is not surprising that all but one
of these cases were decided subsequent to the Supreme Court's sweeping
reform of the juvenile justice system in In re Gault.4 I Though Gault dealt
with the right to counsel and other procedural safeguards in the juvenile
system, much of its rationale may be applied to the civil commitment process
42
with equal authority.
The Criminal-Civil Dichotomy. The involuntary hospitalization of an
individual is a deprivation of liberty pursuant to .an exercise of 'the parens
patriae and/or police powers of the state. Social stigma is a common
consequence. These are precisely the considerations with which the Supreme
Court was concerned in considering Gault's case and the juvenile court
process in general. In both commitment and delinquency proceedings, the
process is denominated "civil" and is usually presided over by a judge of the
probate, family, or domestic relations courts. In both systems, the state's
purpose in seeking confinement of the individual is generally rehabilitative
and often paternalistic. In considering the concept of parens patriae in the
juvenile context, the Gault Court commented that "its meaning is murky and
its historic credentials are of dubious relevance. '43 Surely, parens patriae
may not be a basis for denying constitutional safeguards by attributing such
denials to a noble purpose. When specifically considering the right to
counsel, the Court noted that adults enjoyed a constitutional right to counsel
in felony cases 44 and reasoned 'that "[a] proceeding where the issue is whether
the child will be found to be 'delinquent' and subjected to 'the loss of his
38. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
39. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
40. See Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F.
Supp. 378 (M.D.Ala. 1974); Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D.
Mich. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974); Dixon v. Commonwealth, 325 F.
Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971); McCorkle v. Smith, 100 N.J. Super. 595, 242 A.2d 861
(1968): In re Buttonow, 23 N.Y.2d 385, 244 N.E.2d 677, 297 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1968);
Woodall v. Bigelow, 20 N.Y.2d 852, 231 N.E.2d 779, 285 N.Y.S.2d 85 (1967); In re
Fischer, 39 Ohio St. 2d 71, 313 N.E.2d 851 (1974); In re Popp, 33 Ohio App. 2d 22,
292 N.E.2d 330 (1972).
41. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
42. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
43. 387 U.S. at 16.
44. Id. at 36. The Court cited Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), which held that the right to counsel must be
afforded every criminal defendant before a prison sentence may be imposed, had not yet
been decided.
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liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution. '45 Having recognized the substantive similarity between the loss of liberty to adults
and juveniles, the Court refused to allow the sixth amendment "criminal"
label to result in a triumph of form over substance.
In its oft-cited opinion in Heryford v. Parker46 the Tenth Circuit applied
this reasoning to the loss of liberty as a consequence of civil commitment:
[W]e have a situation in which the liberty of an individual is at stake,
and we think the reasoning in Gault emphatically applies. It matters not
whether the proceedings be labeled 'civil' or 'criminal' or whether
the subject matter be mental instability or juvenile delinquency. It is
the likelihood of involuntary incarceration-whether for punishment
as an adult for a crime, rehabilitation as a juvenile for delinquency,
or treatment and training as a feeble-minded or mental incompetentobservance of the constitutional safeguards of due
which commands
47
process.

In directly analogizing Gault to the civil commitment process, the Tenth
Circuit further stated that when acting in parens patriae, the state must
safeguard due process by insuring "that a subject of an involuntary commitment proceedings [sic] is afforded the opportunity to the guiding hand of
unless effectively waived by
legal counsel at every step of the 4proceedings,
8
one authorized to act in his behalf."
This form of post-Gault reasoning is typical of that expressed in other
decisions which have recognized a due process right to appointed counsel in
civil commitment proceedings.4 9 'In Lessard v. Schmidt,50 for example, the
court matter-of-factly stated: "There seems to be little doubt that a person
detained on grounds of mental illness has a right to counsel, and to be
appointed counsel if the individual is indigent." 5' 1 In fact, the Gault rationale
53
52
has even been extended to peace bond and civil arrest proceedings.
Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in Donaldson is particularly
germane to a discussion of the disappearance of the civil-criminal dichotomy.
While the Chief Justice emphasized the distinction between the state's parens
patriae power and its police power, he expressed "little doubt that in the
exercise of its police power a State may confine individuals solely to protect
society from the dangers of significant antisocial acts . . . -54 Certainly the
incarceration of these potentially dangerous citizens is penal in nature and
tantamount to a criminal sentence in substance.
45. 387 U.S. at 36.
46. 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
47. Id. at 396.
48. Id.

49. See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974); Dixon v. Commonwealth, 325 F.
Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
50. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
414 U.S. 473 (1974).
51. 349 F. Supp. at 1097.
52. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Miller, 452 Pa. 35, 305 A.2d 346 (1973).
53. See, e.g., In re Harris, 69 Cal. 2d 486, 446 P.2d 148, 72 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1968).
54. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 2497, 45 L. Ed. 2d 396, 411 (1975)
(Burger, C.J., concurring).
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In light of Gault and subsequent decisions in the hospitalization area, it
would appear that the criminal-civil distinction is dying a rapid death. It
should no longer present a serious impediment to the application of the sixth
amendment right to counsel to civil commitment proceedings.
Adversary Proceedings and the Presence of a Prosecutor. The criminalcivil distinction discussed above has often been associated with the notion
that those proceedings denominated "criminal" are adversary in nature while
those labeled "non-criminal" or "civil" are not. 55 From that contention, it
might follow that the assistance of counsel is required only in adversary
proceedings. 56 It is the author's view, however, that the latter argument may
be attacked on two grounds. First, the commitment proceeding may be aptly
characterized as an adversary one. Second, the right to counsel, as was
demonstrated above, is not limited to purely criminal cases.
The presence of a prosecutor has been a major factor in those cases in
which the right to counsel has been judicially established. 57 The underlying
and unifying theme has been the belief that it is fundamentally unfair for an
individual to stand alone against the state. Inextricably tied to this notion is
the presumption that a lawyer is representing the state, therefore making the
proceedings adversary in nature. In 1945 the United States Supreme Court,
in considering the right to counsel in a criminal case, noted that a layman is
usually no match for a prosecutor, and, therefore, needs the aid of counsel
"lest he be the victim of overzealous prosecutors."5 8, The major Supreme
Court case on the right to counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright,," is particularly
noteworthy for its preoccupation with the amount of time, money, and legal
expertise which the state expends on a criminal prosecution. More recently,
the Court has taken note of the absence of a prosecutor in refusing to find a
constitutional right to counsel at a hearing in which a suspended sentence
was executed.60
Since the Court unfortunately might weigh the presence-of-a-prosecutor
factor in the commitment area, an examination of the present statutory
picture in the United States with regard to this issue is warranted. Only eight
of fifty-one jurisdictions statutorily require that a lawyer represent the state
at the commitment hearing. 6 ' Seven states incorporate statutory language to
the effect that an attorney for the state may become involved in the proceed55. See, e.g., Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963), where parole revocation proceedings were labeled non-criminal and non-adversary, hence certain procedural
protections such as the right to counsel were held not to be constitutionally mandated.
56. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), where the Supreme Court
refused to find a constitutional right to appointed counsel at a hearing where a suspended
sentence was executed, and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), where the Court
refused to find a right to counsel at a parole revocation hearing. In both cases, the Court
noted the absence of a prosecutor.
,57. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
58. Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 476 (1945).
59. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
60. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
61. See CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-10-111(5) (1974); MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. §
38-213(2) (Supp. 1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-328.02 (1971); NEV. REV. STAT. §
433.693(4) (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-B:4 (Supp. 1973); N.J. REV. STAT. §
30:4-34 (Supp. 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43A, § 55.1 (Supp. 1974); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 25-60(c) (1967).
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ings upon his own initiative, or must do so upon the request of the presiding
judge or -the party seeking -the patient's commitment. 62 The remaining thirtysix jurisdictions make no explicit statutory reference -to the presence of an
attorney for the state in the commitment process. This does not necessarily
mean, however, that an attorney for the state is never involved in the
proceedings in this great majority of the American jurisdictions. It may often
happen that attorneys from offices of the county or district attorney, or the
attorney general will become involved in contested proceedings in an informal manner, when the judge or clerk feels somewhat uneasy in the absence
of a representative of the state.
The decision in Heryford v. Parker,63 in which the Tenth Circuit recognized a constitutional right to counsel in civil commitment, demonstrates that
presence of a prosecutor may be an important factor. The Wyoming statute
governing hospitalization procedures which was contested in Heryford at that
time specifically required the presence of a prosecuting attorney, but merely
granted the proposed patient the right to appear with his own counsel. The
Tenth Circuit stressed this factor in holding that the patient was denied due
process "when, as here, the prosecuting attorney undertakes to 'prosecute the
application [for commitment] on behalf of the state' and the proposed
patient is not otherwise represented by counsel."' 64 The question remains
whether the absence of a prosecutor relegates the civil commitment process
to the category of "non-adversary" proceedings. I would submit that the
Heryford emphasis on the prosecutor's presence is not necessary in order to
find a constitutional right to counsel. In Gault, where the Court discussed the
juvenile's right to counsel, it made no mention of the presence or absence of
a prosecutor. 65 Instead, the Court took a unilateral view of the proceedings
from the perspective of the individual whose liberty was threatened and
emphasized the potential impact of the proceedings upon that individual.
It has sometimes been suggested that a lawyer is not necessary in
commitment cases because the petitioner, the doctors and the judge all have
the proposed patient's interests at heart.66 However, similar reasoning was
rejected out-of-hand by the Court in GaultY' After finding that a juvenile
probation officer and the judge, though ostensibly looking out for the
juvenile's best interest, were insufficient substitutes for a lawyer to act on the
juvenile's behalf, the Court recognized the juvenile's need for the assistance
of an attorney to engage in skilled examination of the facts, to assure that
required formalities and procedures were observed, and to assist him in
preparing and presenting any defense that he might have.68 By stating that
62. IDAHO CODE § 66-329(a) (Supp. 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2917 (Supp.
1974); Ky. REV. STAT. § 202.136 (1972); MINN. STAT. § 253A.07(15) (1971); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 34-2-5(L) (Supp. 1973); N.C.GEN. STAT. § 122-58.7(b) (Supp. 1974);

§ 51.02(3) (1957).
63. 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).

Wis. STAT.

64. Id. at 396.
65. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,35-36 (1967).
66. See SPECIAL COMM. TO STUDY COMMITMENT PROCEDURES OF THE ASS'N OF THE
BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, MENTAL 'ILLNESS AND DUE PROCESS 189-90 (1962).

67. 387 U.S. at 36.

68. Id.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29

the juvenile's non-legal representative was not competent to fill a necessary
legal role, the Court implied that statutes in the juvenile or commitment area
which require the appointment of only a guardian ad litem 69 are constitutionally deficient. 70

The absence of a prosecutor was recently advanced by the State of Ohio
in trying to distinguish the Heryford7 l decision. In rejecting this argument,
the court in In re Fischer72 noted that the portion of the Gault opinion
dealing with right to counsel centered upon the inadequacy of the purported
representatives of the juvenile (probation officer and judge) and not upon
the presence or absence of a prosecutor.
What is particularly disturbing about the presence-of-a-prosecutor factor is
a repeated assertion by the commentators writing on counsel's role. They
lament that the absence of a prosecutor with which the defense attorney may
compete causes "role-lessness," thereby reducing the effectiveness of the
attorney. One recent article has suggested that prosecutors be statutorily
required so that attorneys will be able to discover their proper roles more
easily. 73 This proposal is objectionable because it may lead some courts to
believe that an appointed lawyer will not be an effective advocate unless he
has a prosecutor with whom he may compete. Those who publish on counsel's role in the future should do so with a broad perspective, taking into account all aspects of the commitment process. This will prevent a situation
wherein arguments proposed in one area (counsel's role) have the potential
to detract from those presented in another (the constitutional right to counsel).
In summary, Gault placed great emphasis on the potential for loss of
liberty in finding the need for the assistance of counsel. Gault recognized the
right to counsel as essential to the determination of delinquency which
carries the significant possible consequence of imprisonment. The loss of
liberty is a result so serious that the assistance of counsel is required, as it is
in a criminal prosecution. Be it juvenile or hospitalization proceedings, the
consequence is equally awesome, and the constitutional guarantees equally
applicable.
In developing a constitutional right to appointed counsel in commitment
proceedings under a sixth amendment theory, we need place no special
emphasis upon the particular circumstances of the case. The fact that the
subject of the proceedings may be suffering from a mental disability can be
ignored. 74 This type of analysis was employed in the Gault decision. In
Gault the Court centered upon the loss of liberty impact, giving no special
emphasis to the immaturity factor. Thus, an analysis of the sixth amendment
69. See notes 29-32 supra and accompanying text.
70. This is a logical conclusion because the guardian and attorney fill different roles.
See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1099 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).

71. Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).

72. 39 Ohio St. 2d 71, 313 N.E.2d 851 (1974).
73. See Andalman & Chambers, Effective Counsel for Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, A Polemic and a Proposal,45 Miss. L.J. 43, 76 (1974).

74. This would not be the case under the general due process argument, as will be
seen below. See notes 75-85 infra and accompanying text.
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right to counsel in commitment proceedings need not place any special
emphasis on the mental disability factor.
General Due Process. It has been said that due process is a vague concept
whose "exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies according to
specific factual contexts." 5 Exclusive of sixth amendment considerations,
I would argue that the special disabilities of the proposed mental patient are
such that representation by an attorney is required by the due process clause
to insure that the patient truly enjoys a full and fair opportunity to be
heard. 76 It has been observed that the number of cases on a commitment
docket for any given day presumes that few procedural rights will be asserted
by the patients. 77 Perhaps counsel is the key to due process in the commitment context, 78 especially because a person's mental state may be such that
absent a legally trained advocate the proposed patient's right to be heard
will not be exercised.
The Supreme Court has expressed a concern that procedural safeguards in
proceedings dealing with mental stability should be stringently protected. In
considering Minnesota's sexual psychopath commitment procedures, the
Court stated:
We fully recognize the danger of a deprivation of due process in proceedings dealing with persons charged with insanity

.

.

and the

special importance of maintaining the basic interests of liberty in a
class of cases where the law though 'fair on its face and impartial in
appearances' may be open to serious abuses in administration and
courts may be imposed upon if the substantial rights of the persons
charged are not adequately safeguarded at every stage of the proceedings.7 9
Argersinger v. Hamlin,80 although a sixth amendment right-to-counsel
case, held that counsel was constitutionally required in cases involving
misdemeanor or petty offenses before a jail sentence could be imposed. The
Supreme Court expressed serious concern that the integrity of the adjudicatory process could be impaired by a greater concern with speedily disposing
of a heavy petty offense calendar than with insuring a full and fair opportunity to be heard. 8 ' This same concern is particularly relevant in civil commitment proceedings where often, for reasons of security or convenience, the
75. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.. 420, 442 (1960).
76. No opinion has specifically relied on this theory, but see Bell v. Wayne County
Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974), where the Court seems to be relying
on a fundamental fairness rationale, and McCorkle v. Smith, 100 N.J. Super. 595, 242
A.2d 861 (1968) (dictum), where fundamental fairness, not the sixth amendment or
the Gault decision, was relied upon to find a constitutional right to counsel in commitment proceedings.
77. See Litwack, supra note 2, at 829-30.
78. See Cole, The Nadir of Due Process: An Analysis of Involuntary Civil Commitment Procedures in Alabama, 3 CUMBERLAND-SANFORD L. REV. 8, 28 (1972); Harris,
Mental Illness, Due Process and Lawyers, 55 A.B.A.J. 65, 67 (1969).
79. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 276 (1940) (emphasis added).
80. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
81. Id. at 34.
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judge may travel only periodically to a mental hospital to preside over com82
mitment cases.
There is an additional component to the general due process argument. It
is that -the commitment standards are so ambiguous that an advocate, trained
in the art of cross-examination, is required in order that the physician's expert
opinion might be clarified and crystallized for the trier of fact. No layman,
no guardian ad litem, and surely no patient could be expected to discharge
this responsibility. The method by which the doctor has deduced that a
person is "in need of treatment" or "may be harmful to self or others" must
be scrutinized by coupetent counsel. In addition, Chief Justice Burger,
concurring in Donaldson, implied that it is permissible to confine a potentially dangerous person.8 3 Surely, the basis upon which the expert witness
makes a prediction of such serious consequence must be subject to the
intricate probings and search for truth which are characteristic of an "adversary" proceeding.
General due process issues often are resolved by determining whether the
particular procedure involved is in keeping with or repugnant to our
traditions of fundamental fairness. 8 4 Interestingly, the Supreme Court has
expressly recognized that the quantity of states which observe a certain
procedure, though not determinative, is indicative that the practice is "so
rooted in the tradition and conscience of our people to be ranked as
fundamental." a Thus, since thirty-six jurisdictions mandatorily require the
appointment of counsel for persons facing involuntary commitment, the
Court might well consider this in considering whether there is a fundamental
need for counsel in commitment proceedings.
C.

The Statutes Reconsidered: The Future
Through commitment, the state's authority, be it based on the concept of
parens patriae or police power, is visited upon the prospective patient for the
purpose of depriving him of his liberty. This "awesome prospect"8 6 is the
basis for a constitutional mandate that the assistance of an attorney for the
person sought to be committed is required. Whether the proceedings are
labeled "criminal" or "civil," adversary or non-adversary, retributive or
rehabilitative, due process requires that an individual be entitled to the
assistance of counsel before the state may take away his freedom.
Were the Supreme Court to decide this issue today, it could rely on either
a sixth amendment or a general due process theory in finding a constitutional
right to counsel. The Court would most likely choose the former since it is a
logical extension of the Gault decision and would be firmly supported by
precedent. In addition, the Court would probably prefer to deal with a pure
"serious loss of liberty" theory under the sixth amendment rather than to
82. See Cohen, supra note 2, at 428.

83. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 2497, 45 L. Ed. 2d 396, 411 (197.5)
(Burger, C.J., concurring).
84. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
85. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952).
86. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 37 (1967).
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delve into the specific factual considerations of the commitment process
necessary in a general due process inquiry. The rule would probably take the
following form: Before any person may be involuntarily committed, he must
be represented by counsel, unless, upon being advised of his right to have
counsel appointed, he knowingly waives that right.
Returning to the statutory classification previously discussed, those thirtysix jurisdictions which require the appointment of counsel probably go further than the Constitution demands. This extra protection evidences the
legislatures' solicitous attitude toward the individual facing commitment.
Those states which require the appointment of counsel after the patient has
been advised of and requests the services of counsel embody the constitutional minimum. The ten remaining state statutes which make counsel discretionary or make no provision for counsel are constitutionally deficient.
III.

WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN

CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS

Although it has been concluded that there is a right to counsel in
commitment cases, it is possible that the right may not be exercised. The
notion of waiver takes on serious implications in a context where allegedly
mentally ill persons are involved. Is the concept of waiver antithetical to the
purpose of involuntary hospitalization of the mentally ill? Is more protection
than that granted the mentally stable citizen required? In dealing with these
questions, I will first consider the problem as perceived, if at all, by
legislatures, and will then analyze the problem from a judicial perspective.
A. Waiver and the State Statutes
In considering whether the statutory right to counsel may be waived in the
various American jurisdictions surveyed, I shall consider only those states
which make some affirmative statutory provision for the appointment of
counsel.8 7 These states may be grouped into several categories.
Waiver by Failing To Request Counsel. Five states condition the statutory
right to appointed counsel upon an affirmative request by the patient,8 8 be it
prompted by the proposed patient's original perception of the need for a
lawyer or by the presiding judge's statement as to the availability of free
legal assistance. As was stated previously, this statutory scheme would
seemingly comport with the minimum requirements of due process. 8 9 The
87. The following statutes, which will not be discussed, either grant the judge total
discretion in making appointments or totally fail to mention attorneys: ALA. CODE tit.
21, §§ 11, 15 (1958); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-419 (1971); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 334-82
(1968); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-21-3 (1972); NEV. REV. STAT. § 433.693(1) (1973);
N.J. REV. STAT. § 30:4-41 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 88(c) (McKinney 1971); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (Page 1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §
4406 (1969); WIS. STAT. § 51.02(4) (1957).
88. MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 13(c) (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-325.01 (1971);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-93-11(6) (1970); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 55 (1954);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.20(1)(b) (1975).
89. See note 27 supra and accompanying text. See also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407

U.S. 25 (1972).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29

question remains, however, whether such a procedural mechanism should be
acceptable in a proceeding where the mental health of the individual is in
question. That issue will be discussed after this brief statutory summary is
concluded.
Counsel Mandatory, but Waiver Possible by Failing To Request Hearing.
This variety of statute guarantees a patient an absolute right to appointed
counsel at the commitment hearing, but requires the patient to affirmatively
request that hearing or permits him to waive the right to a hearing. 90 Thus,
the uncounseled patient who fails to request a hearing in effect waives the
statutory right to counsel. In these states, the failure to act has a doublefaceted consequence. By failing to request a hearing, the patient is not only
deprived of the right to communicate with a legally trained advocate
provided by the state about the nature of the proceedings, but he is also
deprived of his liberty without a judicial determination that the commitment
standard has been met.
In Virginia the patient is not appointed counsel unless he refuses to sign a
voluntary commitment document. 91 A hearing is required before the court
will allow the patient to execute such a document. This proceeding is not
labeled the commitment hearing, but rather is termed one to determine
competency to execute a voluntary commitment instrument. Counsel is not
present at such a proceeding. However, in substance, this is a hearing which
may result in the patient's indefinite confinement. Similar waiver consequences are possible in the other statutes in this group.
Counsel Mandatory, Waiver Not Mentioned. Twenty-six jurisdictions employ
mandatory language in their right to counsel statutes, and in each of these
states a commitment hearing is also mandatory. 92 These provisions make no
reference to the possibility of waiver nor to the circumstances under which
one might be allowed.
Counsel Mandatory, Waiver Mentioned. Six states make specific reference to
the possibility and efficacy of waiver of the statutory right to appointed
counsel in commitment cases. New Hampshire provides an absolute right to
90.

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467(2) (1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-505.3(a) (1971);
Ch. 91%/2, § 6-4 (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-67.1 (Supp.
cf. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §§ 72(3), 88(c) (McKinney 1971) (hearing

ILL. REV. STAT.

1975);
must be affirmatively requested, but counsel not mandatory).
91. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-67.1 (Supp. 1975).
92. ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.30.070(e), (h) (1971); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-536
(1974); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5302 (West 1972); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2710-107(5) (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-178 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §
5125 (Supp. 1974); D.C. CODE ANN. H9 21-542, -543 (1967); IDAHO CODE § 66329(d), (e) (Supp. 1975); IND. CODE § 16-14-9-16 (1973); IOWA CODE § 229.4, .5
(1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2914(A), (C) (Supp. 1974); Ky. REV. STAT. §H
202.135(4), .136 (1972); LA. REV. STAT. § 28:53(A) (Supp. 1975); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 34, § 2334 (Supp. 1974); MINN. STAT. §§ 253A.07(8), (15) (1971); Mo. REV.
STAT. §§ 202.807(2), (4) (1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. H9 34-2-5(E), (F) (Interim Supp.
1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-58.7(a), (c) (Supp. 1974); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 262-11, -13 (1968); S.C. CODE ANN. H9 32-961, -962 (Supp. 1974); TENN. CODE ANN. §
33-604(c) (Supp. 1974); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-43 (1958); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 64-7-36(4), (5) (Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7111, 7605 (1968);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-5-4(b), (c) (Supp. 1975); WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-60(f)
(1967), (g) (Supp. 1975).

1975]

CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS

counsel unless it is waived by "an informed decision, '93 but what constitutes
an informed decision is not articulated. Massachusetts requires the court to
appoint counsel for an indigent proposed patient unless such appointment is
refused.94 A waiver determination is obviously practical, since it is based
upon the external conduct of the patient, 95 but the problem of "guessing" at
what in fact constitutes a refusal is still present. Oregon requires the
presiding judge to appoint counsel for the indigent person facing commitment
unless he "expressly, knowingly and intelligently" refuses counsel. 90 Michigan requires the appointment of counsel, but allows the proposed patient,
after consultation with appointed counsel, to waive counsel in writing.9 7
Montana specifically prohibits waiver of the right to counsel in commitment
hearings. 98 South Dakota does not use the word "waiver," but states that a
person charged with being mentally ill shall in no case be without legal
representation. 9
B.

Cases and Theory on Waiver

Should waiver of the right to counsel ever be allowed in commitment
proceedings? If the state claims that the patient is so mentally ill as to be
unable to care for himself and/or is potentially dangerous to others, it is
difficult to comprehend how the state can allow that same person to make
his own decision about being represented by counsel.
I see two distinct aspects to the waiver issue in the civil commitment
context. The first is the problem of whether the patient fully understands his
legal right to counsel under the applicable statute and the second is whether
he perceives the practical need for legal representation. The latter consideration is usually taken for granted in other contexts, such as in ordinary
criminal prosecutions. The person accused of a crime generally has no
problem perceiving the need for a lawyer. For a proposed mental patient,
however, the ability to perceive the need for an attorney and the consequences of failure to consult one is not as clear.
Waiver in Criminal Cases. Johnson v. Zerbst'0 0 established the test for
evaluating waiver of the right to counsel in criminal cases as the voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent relinquishment of a fully known right. In Johnson
the Supreme Court listed factors such as background, experience, and
conduct of the accused which should be considered in determining waiver. In
later cases, the Court has applied a strong presumption against waiver and
has imposed a "heavy burden" upon the party asserting its validity. 10 ' Even
93. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 135-B:5 (Supp. 1973).
94. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 5 (Supp. 1974).

95. Of course, the case may arise where the proposed patient's mental condition is
such that his external conduct does not deserve any credence. This is precisely the
problem that waiver presents. Do we force a lawyer upon him or accept his waiver?
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

ORE. REV. STAT. § 426.100(2) (1974).
MICH.COMP. LAWS § 330.1454 (1975).
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 34-1304(1) (Interim Supp. 1975).
S.D. CODE § 27-7-2.6 (Interim Supp. 1975).
304 U.S. 458 (1938).
See, e.g., VonMoltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
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the fact that a criminal defendant is an attorney is not determinative in
deciding whether a legally valid waiver has occurred. 10 2 Rather, it must be
shown that the accused was acquainted with his right to counsel, that an
offer to provide counsel was made, and that such offer was voluntarily and
intelligently declined.' 08
Waiver in Juvenile Cases. I have tapped the Gault case as a fruitful source
for the development of a constitutional right to counsel in the commitment
sphere, but the case is, regrettably, of minimal help in examining the
problem of waiver of counsel at the hearing stage. In a mere passing
reference to the concept, the Gault Court did no more than reiterate the
"knowing-voluntary relinquishment" rule of Johnson v. Zerbst.10 4 The
Court ignored the factor of immaturity which is inherent in the juvenile
system and which may impair the ability to understand and to make
meaningful choices. In discussing the interrogation of juveniles in other cases,
however, the Court has expressed doubt as to the validity of waivers by
juveniles. 105 A totality of circumstances test nevertheless persists for determining the validity of a juvenile's alleged waiver of counsel at both the
interrogation' 0 6 and adjudication' 0 7 stages. Age, education, background,
and knowledge of the charge have been mentioned as factors to be considered.' 08 Despite countless statutes which refuse to grant enforceable effect to
contractural obligations incurred by persons below a certain age,' 0 9 the
aversion to establishing a per se rule prohibiting waiver of constitutional
rights by juveniles continues to prevail.
Applying Waiver Theories Where Mental Capacity is in Issue. Lack of
judicial scrutiny over the waiver of counsel by a proposed patient can lead to
serious abuses. In a study of 756 commitments over a five-year period in one
Florida county, it was discovered that only two hearings were held. 10 The
researchers attributed this to a hearing waiver clause which was incorporated
in the notice receipt and which the patient was asked to sign at the time
notice of the initiation of commitment proceedings was served.
The Supreme Court has not ruled directly upon the issue of waiver of
procedural rights in civil commitment, but the Court has indicated its
disposition in analogous areas. Pate v. Robinson,' for example, involved a
102. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
103. See Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1961).
104. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 44 (1967).
105. See, e.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1947).

106. See, e.g., West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1968); Shioutakon v.
District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956); McClintock v. State, 253 N.E.2d
233 (Ind. 1969); In re McDaniel, 302 P.2d 496 (Okla. Crim. 1956).

107. See, e.g., In re R.M., 105 N.J. Super. 372, 252 A.2d 237 (1969).
108. See, e.g., West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1968) (discussing waiver
of counsel at the interrogation stage); In re R.M., 105 N.J. Super. 372, 252 A.2d 237
(1969) (discussing waiver of counsel at the adjudication stage).
109. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1556 (West 1954), which provides that minors do
not have the capacity to contract; N.Y. GEN. OBLIo. LAw § 3-101 (McKinney Supp.
1974), which provides the exceptions to the rule that a minor may disaffirm a contract.
110. See Fein & Miller, Legal Processes and Adjudication in Mental Incompetency

Proceedings,20 Soc. PROB. 57, 59 (1972).
111. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
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criminal defendant who allegedly waived his right to have the trial court
determine his competency to stand trial. In reversing the conviction on due
process grounds, the Court stated that "it is contradictory to argue that a
defendant may be incompetent and yet knowingly or intelligently 'waive' his
right to have the court determine his capacity to stand trial. 11 2 Thus, the
Court recognized that although one may be legally competent to understand
the nature of the criminal prosecution against him and to cooperate in his
defense, it does not necessarily follow that he possesses the capacity to
perceive 'the need for procedural protections such as the assistance of
counsel.
Waiver of Counsel in Civil Commitment Proceedings. The literature on the
right to counsel in commitment cases is sparse, but there is even less material
concerning the waiver of that right. It has been suggested by one commentator that waiver of counsel be permissible so long as it is knowing and
voluntary,1 13 but no means to determine what constitutes voluntariness in
this context is proposed. Another author recommends that the individual
sought to be committed must manifest a desire that counsel be appointed
before the right to counsel arises." 4 Again, the questions of the individual's
mental capacity to manifest that desire, and his inability to comprehend the
consequences if he fails to do so, are ignored. Lastly, it has been proposed
that procedural rights be absolute, but only on request,"15 thereby assuming
the capacity to request and to perceive the need for and significance of such
action.
Due to minimal consideration of waiver by other writers, no suggestions
for analyzing the waiver of counsel problems in this context have yet been
offered. I would suggest that a two-pronged approach be employed. First, it
must be determined whether the Johnson v. Zerbst voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent waiver standard should be applied in commitment proceedings or
whether a more strict test specifically guaged for persons whose mental
stability is in question should be fashioned. Second, however strict the waiver
standard may be, it must be decided what procedural mechanism should be
employed to determine whether the standard has in fact been met.
I would submit that a special standard for waiver in civil commitment is
unnecessary. Furthermore, as a practical matter, it is unlikely that the
Supreme Court would develop such a special standard. The voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent relinquishment of a fully known right is a substantive test which will protect the proposed patient. What is required is a more
realistic and meaningful application of this test by the judiciary.
The inherently coercive character of custodial surroundings which has
112. Id. at 384. In Virgin Islands v. Niles, 295 F. Supp. 266 (D.V.I. 1969), the court
similarly concluded that one subject to paranoid delusions, although competent to stand
trial, is incompetent to waive the right to counsel and to represent himself. But see Logan
v. Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Conn. 1972), af'd mem. sub nom. Briggs v. Arafeh,
411 U.S. 911 (1973).
113. Elliott, ProceduresFor Involuntary Commitment on the Basis of Alleged Mental
Illness, 42 U. COLO. L.REV. 231, 259 (1970).
114. Kaplan, Civil Commitment "As You Like It," 49 B.U.L. Rnv. 14, 42 (1969).
115. Ennis, Civil Liberties and Mental Illness, 7 CRIM. LAW BULL. 101, 110 (1971).
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been recognized to exist in police interrogation in the criminal area 1 6 is
inversely analogous to the atmosphere in commitment proceedings. Instead
of producing a coercive atmosphere, custodial confinement prior to the
commitment hearing may produce an inhibitive or repressive environment.
Consequently, the assertion of procedural rights, regardless of any advisement as to their availability, may rarely occur. The integrity of a waiver
under these circumstances is thus subject to serious question. Furthermore,
patients may be under sedation prior to or even during their appearance in
court. In this connection, it has been observed that drugs such as thorazine,
stellazine, and mellaril may diminish initiative, sap the individual's will to
act, and reduce his resistance to erroneous incarceration.' 17
Given the factual need for an attorney in a commitment case, the problem
of what should be done where the allegedly ill person protests the appointment of counsel is a troublesome one. May we constitutionally force a lawyer
upon every proposed patient in order to avoid the difficulties of the waiver
concept as applied in this context? Most recently, the Supreme Court has
passed on this issue in relation to criminal prosecutions by holding that a
state may not impose an attorney upon a criminal defendant against his
will. 1 8 The Court found that to prohibit a voluntary and intelligent waiver,
would be to violate the sixth amendment. Thus, the Court seems to be very
solicitous toward a person's choice as to whether to accept legal representation provided by the state. Therefore, one writer's suggestion that waiver of
counsel never be allowed in commitment cases" 9 might meet with constitutional objection. In addition, to completely prohibit waiver of counsel is to
prejudge the very issue which is sought to be determined in the proceeding
itself,' 20 that is, the individual's mental health and capacity. Some procedure
short of forced counsel must be formulated to protect against improvident
waivers. Unfortunately, cases in this area recognize the problem, but offer no
1
solutions to it.12
Fortunately, the majority of cases considering waiver of the right to
counsel in hospitalization proceedings exhibit a protective attitude. 1 22 The
116. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
117. See Partridge, supra note 25, at 92.
118. Faretta v. California, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975).
119. See Note, Compulsory Counsel for California's New Mental Health Law, 17
U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 851, 864 (1970).
120. Cf. In re Lambert, 134 Cal. 626, 66 P. 851 (1901), where the court held that to
say notice to the patient is useless because he is insane is to beg the very question which
is the subject of the proceeding.
121. Judicial insensitivity burdens the waiver concept. Judicial ignorance of the
proposed patient's mental disabilities is evidenced by the following passage:
The statute clearly leaves the matter of appointment of counsel in the discretion of the court where no request is made. The record here discloses
that appellant was advised of his right to counsel and that no request was
made. We must therefore indulge in the presumption in favor of the regularity of the proceedings leading to the judgment and order of commitment.
In re People, 190 Cal. App. 2d 253, 12 Cal. Rptr. 60, 63 (1961).
122. See, e.g., Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968); Dooling v. Overholser, 243 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Thorn v. Superior Court, I Cal. 3d 666, 464
P.2d 56, 83 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1970); In re Hnat, 250 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1971); People
v. Breese, 34 Ill. 2d 61, 213 N.E.2d 500 (1966); People v. Couvion, 33 111. 2d 408, 211
N.E.2d 746 (1965).
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underlying theme common to all such decisions was best expressed by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Dooling v.
Overholser:123 "No case arises to question the validity of a commitment
under our statute unless in the very proceeding to which the right of
representation applies the person alleged to be insane has been found in fact
to be insane. Such a person cannot be deemed to have intelligently waived
the statutory right to be represented by counsel."'1 24 Furthermore, it is
apparent that absent a determination that the proposed patient fully understands his situation, he cannot knowingly assert or waive his rights. 1 25
In contrast to the courts' protective attitude regarding waiver in commitment proceedings, there is some sentiment in the medical community that
standards and procedures for determining waivers by proposed mental
patients should be the same as those applied to other persons.126 The main
contention is that it is possible for a person to have the capacity to waive, yet
still to be properly committed. 1 27 In other words, it is argued that there is not
a necessary medical relationship between competency to waive and commitability. Even if this distinction is valid, however, a hearing to determine
competency to waive procedural rights would then be necessary before the
court could consider the commitability issue. Such a bifurcated system seems
overly cumbersome and subject to the same objections as that applicable to
128
the Virginia statute heretofore discussed.
A series of recent decisions concerning waiver of counsel in commitment
cases reveals the crucial problem in waiver to be articulating the right so that
the patient fully understands it. The Illinois Supreme Court in People v.
Breese1 29 and People v. Couvion 8 0 held that written notice of the availability of legal assistance was insufficient to support an allegation of a knowing
waiver. Similarly, an Oregon appellate court ruled that a judge's failure to
specify a right to "court appointed" counsel made a knowing waiver
impossible.' 3 ' In order for a reviewing court to even consider the possibility
of a waiver, it must be shown that the right to appointed counsel was fully
articulated to the patient so that he fully understood its practical and legal
implications.
C.

Proposalsfor Dealing with the Waiver Problem

It would seem that a balance must be struck between the extremes of
forced counsel and counsel only upon affirmative request. The appropriate
123. 243 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
124. Id. at 829.
125. See Thorn v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 366, 464 P.2d 56, 83 Cal. Rptr. 600
(1970).
126. See Note, The Right to Counsel at Civil Competency Proceedings, 40 TEMPLE
L.Q. 381, 391 (1967).
127. See H. DAVmSON, FoaRNsIc PSYCHIATRY 196 (1952). See also Logan v. Arafeh,
346 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Conn. 1972), af 'd mem. sub nor. Briggs v. Arafeh, 411 U.S.
911 (1973).
128. See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
129. 34 Ill.
2d 61, 213 N.E.2d 500 (1966).
130. 33 II1. 2d 408, 211 N.E.2d 746 (1965).

131. State v. Collman, 497 P.2d 1233 (Ore. App. 1972).
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solution is to strictly interpret and apply the Johnson v. Zerbst test. The
proposed patient must fully understand that he has an absolute right to the
assistance of appointed counsel. And, he must be made aware of the
practical advantages of having an attorney appear in court as an advocate on
his behalf. There can be no valid waiver unless these two aspects of the
situation are fully comprehended by the patient. A choice not to be
represented by appointed counsel without regard to these two considerations
might be deemed voluntary, but it could never be considered intelligent.
Thus, the crucial problem is the method by which a court is to evaluate a
proposed patient's decision to proceed without the assistance of court appointed or retained counsel and to determine if it is truly intelligent.
External conduct by the proposed patient in refusing to accept legal
representation after an initial attorney-client interview is one way by which
waiver by a proposed mental patient might be evaluated. 13 2 This first
consultation should be statutorily required of the appointed attorney, and
should consist of an explanation of the proceedings, the advantages of being
represented by legal counsel, and the fact that the court has appointed the
attorney to represent the patient free of charge.' 3 3 After this consultation,
the patient's objective refusal13 4 to allow the attorney to continue as his
counsel might properly be deemed a valid waiver. But in order for a person
to comprehend the legal right to be represented by counsel and to perceive
the practical advantages of legal representation, statutes should require an
inital attorney-client interview. The physical presence of the attorney will be
the personification of the nebulous "right to counsel," and his explanation of
his duties and obligations as the proposed patient's advocate should contribute to the person's understanding of the advantages of legal representation
and the consequences of declining it. After this has been accomplished, the
judge presiding at the commitment hearing will be provided with a more
concrete foundation upon which to base the acceptance of a waiver. As a
practical matter, however, judges at commitment proceedings may presume
the invalidity of all waivers by those alleged to be mentally ill. Should the
judge force counsel on the protesting, proposed patient, however, he runs the
risk of jeopardizing decorum in his courtroom.

IV.

EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN
CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS

A discussion urging the express recognition of a constitutional right to
counsel for indigents facing involuntary hospitalization and proposing strong
132. See Litwack, supra note 2, at 823.

133. In California, the non-legal staff of the treatment facility is required to explain
the right to counsel to the patient. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5252.1 (West 1971);
see Litwack, supra note 2, at 823. It was under this framework that serious waiver problems arose in Thorn v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 666, 464 P.2d 56, 83 Cal. Rptr. 600
(1970).
134. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 5 (Supp. 1974) which requires the court
to appoint counsel for the person facing commitment unless he "refuses." This statute
does not explicitly require an initial attorney-client interview, but the use of the words

"unless such person refuses" seems to indicate a presumption against waiver. Thus, this
statute is more protective than most.
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protection against incompetent waiver thereof would be incomplete without a
reference to the relevancy of the notion of effective assistance of counsel.
Though countless articles have been published about counsel's role in the
commitment process, 135 few have concentrated on the fundamental question
of what, in this context, constitutes effective assistance of counsel as a matter
of constitutional principle. Relevant issues include a discussion of the merits
of the full-time mental health advocate system, the number and nature of
statutory duties, if any, that should be required of attorneys, and whether
more strict judicial scrutiny should be given to ineffective assistance of
counsel claims in commitment proceedings.
A. Summary of Counsel's Role
A decade has passed since the publication of Professor Cohen's comprehensive study of appointed counsel's role in the commitment process, in
which it was concluded that such attorneys were relatively ineffective. 13 6
The last decade has not seen much progress, for a 1974 survey revealed that
many mental patients are still not receiving adequate representation, 137 as
appointed counsel expend little effort on behalf of their clients who are
facing commitment. The belief that appointed lawyers in commitment cases
are generally ineffective has two effects. First, the argument that counsel is
constitutionally required so as to insure due process is weakened. Second,
there is a danger that the appointment of counsel may, or actually has,
become a mere procedural ritual which helps to sanctify the judgment of
commitment without injecting any substantive protection.
The various suggestions by the commentators as to counsel's role may be
summarized as follows: (1) explain the nature of the proceedings to the
client and interview him to ascertain what action he wishes to take; 1 38 (2)
undertake a factual investigation of the client's background and the circumstances of the case, 1 39 including interviews with the person seeking the
client's commitment, the examining physician(s) and family members, and
the examination of hospital records ;140 (3) demand a jury trial, if available,
after consultation with the client;' 4 ' (4) speak on behalf of the client who
135. See, e.g., R. ROCK, M. JACOBSON
CHARGE OF THE MENTALLY ILL 157 (1968);

& R. JANOPAUL. HOSPITALIZATION AND DISAndalman & Chambers, supra note 73; Blei-

cher, Compulsory Care for the Mentally ill, 16 CLEvE.-MAR. L. REV. 93 (1967); Blinick,
Mental Disability, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 33 ALBANY L. REV. 92
(1968); Cohen, supra note 2; Cole, supra note 78; Ennis, supra note 115; Litwack, supra
note 2; Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1190 (1974); Comment, The Expanding Role of the Lawyer and the Court in
Securing Psychiatric Treatment for Patients Confined Pursuant to Civil Commitment,
6 Hous. L. REV. 519 (1968); Note, Civil Commitment: Should There Be a Constitutional Right to Counsel, 2 CAPITAL U.L. REV. 126 (1973); Note, The New York Mental
Health Information Service: A New Approach to the Hospitalization of the Mentally
III, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 672 (1967); Note, The Right to Counsel at Civil Competency
Proceedings,40 TEMP. L.Q. 381 (1967).
136. Cohen, supra note 2.
137. Andalman & Chambers, supra note 73.
138. Id. at 51.
139. Id.; Cohen, supra note 2, at 452.
140. Andalman & Chambers, supra note 73, at 51.
141. Cohen, supra note 2, at 451.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29

may be illiterate, inarticulate, or timid; 142 (5) employ ordinary advocacy
skills such as producing evidence, cross-examining witnesses, and guarding
procedural rights; (6) investigate alternatives to commitment; 143 (7) prepare the client for commitment if no other disposition can be agreed
144
upon.
The legal community may agree that these suggestions are admirable, but
the continuing sentiment is that in many localities they are still theory, not
practice. 145 There must be a cause for the failure to realize these goals.
Once the cause is discovered, perhaps a lasting solution can be found.
B. The Problem Exposed
There is not a great body of case law dealing with ineffective counsel in
the commitment process. The decision of the Iowa Surpeme Court in
Prochaska v. Brinegar 46 demonstrates the unfortunate lack of meaningful
judicial concern for the practical difficulties in this area. Prochaska involved
an attorney who failed to consult with his client prior to the hearing which
resulted in a judgment of commitment. In refusing to find a violation of due
process on the ineffective counsel claim, the court found that "[t]here was at
least a technical compliance with the statute" which required the appointment of counsel, 147 thereby concluding that the mere appointment of
counsel constituted sufficient substantive protection for the proposed patient.
Similarly, the District of Columbia Circuit refused to find ineffective assistance of counsel in a commitment case where the attorney advocated
hospitalization since he was convinced that it was proper. 148 It should be
obvious that this type of reasoning converts a substantive guarantee into a
meaningless formality.
Fortunately, more recent decisions evidence a reluctance to allow mere
technical compliance with the statutory right to counsel to thwart an inquiry
into the effectiveness of the appointed attorney. In Quesnell v. State,' 49 for
example, the appointed lawyer neither discussed the case with his client nor
did he call any witnesses during the hearing which led to the client's
involuntary hospitalization. The patient appealed on an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim and won a new commitment hearing. At this second hearing
both retained counsel and an appointed attorney ad litem were present. 50
The attorney ad litem waived a jury trial over the protest of retained
counsel. The trial court nevertheless accepted the waiver. In reversing the
trial court, the Washington Supreme Court held that the patient was again
142. Symposium-Is Counsel Needed at Commitment Hearings?, 23 LaAL AM
BRIEF CASE 13, 14 (1964).

143. Cohen, supra note 2, at 451-52. Even if the client is technically commitable,
a more desirable placement may be arranged.
144. Andalman & Chambers, supra note 73, at 51.
145. Id.
146. 251 Iowa 1214, 102 N.W.2d 870 (1960).
147. 102 N.W.2d at 871.
148. In re Basso, 299 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
149. 83 Wash. 2d 224, 517 P.2d 568 (1973).
150. This situation illustrates some of the rather irregular procedures which occur in
a "mental illness court" even when the patient is represented by counsel.
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denied effective assistance of counsel when the attorney ad litem waived a
procedural right without first consulting his client.
In Hawks v. Lazaro15 ' the appointed attorney assumed the role of a
guardian rather than an advocate. He waived his client's physical presence at
the hearing, failed to discuss the case with the proposed patient, and did not
oppose commitment. 15 2 The court reversed the judgment, finding counsel so
ineffective as to constitute a violation of due process.
Cases such as Hawks and Quesnell illustrate 1he defects of the so-called
attorney-for-the-day system often employed in both the civil commitment
and juvenile processes. This is a method by which one lawyer represents
every patient who appears for his commitment hearing on a particular
day.' 53 The attorney is paid a scheduled fee for each case which he handles.
I would submit that this system is the primary cause of ineffective legal
representation in the civil commitment process. The attorney is theoretically
present to render competent legal assistance to each of his clients, but in
practice the sheer number of cases on the calendar combined with the
limited time alloted for hearing them' 5 4 often prohibits the attorney from
even approaching the goals suggested by the commentators. Some courts
considering timeliness of appointment of counsel in criminal cases have
fashioned a presumption that an untimely appointment constitutes a prima
facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel.1 5 5 There is no reason why this
doctrine should not be applied in the civil commitment sphere. The attorneyfor-the-day system effectively creates a situation whereby each appointment
of counsel is untimely.
A judicial presumption may cure some of the minor problems of the
system, but not its basic unfairness and inadequacy. Possible means to rectify
the problem must be formulated so that the mental patient is guaranteed a
minimally effective counsel.
C. Possible Remedies
The Full-Time Advocate. The abundance of articles on counsel's role in the
commitment process impliedly questions the competence and professional
integrity of the private practitioner. This is made apparent by continued
praise for the full-time mental health advocate systems.
The decade since Professor Cohen's study 56 highlighting the inadequacies
of our present system of providing legal representation of indigent persons
facing commitment has not led to many well received suggestions for cures.
151.

202 S.E.2d 109 (W. Va. 1973).

152. This is not to say that failure to oppose commitment is determinative of an incffective assistance of counsel claim. Rather, such a failure, when coupled with a failure to perform other tasks ordinarily expected of an attorney, is indicative of ineffective
assistance.
153. See Andalman & Chambers, supra note 73, at 56; Cohen, supra note 2, at 428.
154. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 2, at 430, where it was shown that forty commitment hearings were held in seventy-five minutes during the judge's monthly visit to a
mental hospital in Travis County, Texas.
155. See, e.g., Calloway v. Powell, 393 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1968); Coles v. Payton,
389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1968).
156. Cohen, supra note 2.
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A recent comprehensive article, in fact, regards the full-time mental health
advocate as the only adequate system which will provide proposed mental
patients with competent counsel. 157 The elimination of time pressures,
development of expertise, and dedication to clients have been recognized as
particularly attractive aspects of the system.' 58 The praise for this system
has been amplified by the success of the New York Mental Health
Information Service,' 59 where a staff of full-time attorneys and social
workers is assigned ito represent indigent patients in commitment proceedings
conducted in New York's first and second judicial departments.
Although the full-time advocate might be the "best" system, the practicing
bar should not be so quickly rejected as a source from which to draw
appointed attorneys. A 1969 study of commitment at a mid-western hospital
revealed that a higher percentage of patients were discharged when counsel
was present than when the patient was unrepresented, 160 so it is obvious
that, from the proposed patient's perspective, some counsel is better than
none. The underlying assumption of the proponents of the full-time advocate
is that, although there may be a causal connection between the presence of
an attorney and the outcome of the proceeding, the full-time advocate system
is the optimum method for achieving the most beneficial effect. As a
practical matter, however, even if the full-time advocate is the most effective
method for affording competent counsel to proposed mental patients, it is
unrealistic to hope for the establishment of such a system in all areas of the
United States. Most areas have neither the volume nor the funds nor the
qualified personnel to set up a program such as that in New York. 6 ' Even
that program is fully operative as a patient advocate's office only in the
populous areas in and around New York City which comprise a major
portion of the first and second judicial departments. 16 2 A "next best"
alternative to the full-time advocate must, therefore, be examined.
Statutorily Imposed Duties. A disturbing aspect of the ineffective assistance
of counsel concept is the reluctance of the courts to establish a meaningful
standard by which to determine such post-judgment claims. In criminal cases
most jurisdictions apply a "mockery of justice" test, 163 which is of little
157. See Andalman & Chambers, supra note 73, at 80-82.
158. See Litwack, supra note 2, at 839.
159. See Ennis, supra note 115, at 126; Note, The New York Mental Health In!ormation Service: A New Approach to Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 67 COLUM.
L. REV. 672 (1967). But see Bleicher, supra note 135, at 106-07.
160. Wenger & Fletcher, The Effect of Legal Counsel on Admissions to a State Mental Hospital: A Confrontation of Professions, 10 J. HEALTH & SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 66, 69
(1969).
161. New York and other big cities would seem to be the only areas which have a
sufficient volume of cases to justify the expenditure of taxpayers' money for a full-time
staff of attorneys, psychiatric social workers, and secretarial support. See Note, The
New York Mental Health Information Service: A New Approach to the Hospitalization
of the Mentally Il1, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 672 (1967), for a comprehensive, though somewhat outdated, discussion of the New York program. For a more recent article, see
Rosenzweig, Mental Health Information Service: A Review of Rules and Regulations,
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 18, 1975, at 1.
162. Note, supra note 161, at 675, 690.
163. See Bell v. Alabama, 367 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1966); Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d
698 (5th Cir. 1966); People v. Washington, 41 Ill. 2d 16, 241 N.E.2d 425 (1968). The
Fifth Circuit employs a somewhat more protective standard by inquiring if counsel's per.
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protection for the convict who claims that he was prejudiced. The paucity of
case law in the civil commitment context leaves us with no formalized rule.
Statutorily imposed duties might provide a solution.
The Draft Act, upon which many states relied in revising their commitment procedures, 164 makes no mention of counsel's duties, 165 so neither do
most of the state statutes. Further, of the fifty-one jurisdictions studied, fortyfive make no provision for timeliness or appointment of counsel, preparation
time, or suggested duties. All that these statutes provide for is counsel at the
hearing, a provision which obviously sanctions the inadequate attorney-forthe-day system.
Four states and the District of Columbia employ some statutory directive
in this area. 166 Minnesota provides for a mandatory hearing, mandatory
appointment of counsel, and requires that counsel consult with the patient
prior to the hearing. 1 7 The statute further grants the attorney adequate
preparation time and subpoena power. Though in substance these are
minimal mandates, they are exceptional compared to the statutes of most
American jurisdictions. This type of provision may help to improve the
quality of representation in a small way, but it is lacking in that it does not
contain specified time periods within which the duties must be performed.
Therefore, the attorney-for-the-day system may be allowed to thrive thereunder.
The new Arizona statute is the most innovative in the United States, for
it not only imposes statutory duties on attorneys, 168 but it also sets forth
time periods within which they must be performed. The adoption of this
scheme in other jurisdictions could do much to cure the ills of the attorneyfor-the-day system.
The statute first provides that counsel be appointed for an indigent patient
at least three days prior to the date of the hearing. 16 9 Discovery is automatic
in that all medical reports and legal documents must be furnished to the
attorney by the medical director of the agency which conducted the evaluation, at least seventy-two hours prior to the hearing. The attorney must then
fulfill the following minimal duties within the specified time limits:
(1) interview the client within twenty-four hours of his appointment; (2)
review all reports and records at least twenty-four hours prior to the hearing;
(3) interview the party who initiated the proceedings and, as well, his
supporting witness, if known and available, at least twenty-four hours prior
to the hearing; (4) interview the physician who will testify at least twentyfour hours before the hearing, if available; (5) submit a written report to the
formance was "reasonably effective." See, e.g., West v. Louisiana, 478 F.2d 1026 (5th
Cir. 1973); MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960).
164. See note 22 supra.
165. DRAFTACT § 9(f).
166. Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-536 (1974); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-9-105
(3), -109 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-543 (1967); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2914
(D) (Supp. 1974); MINN. STAT. § 253A.07(15) (1971); N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW
§ 88 (McKinney 1971) (standards for Mental Health Information Service).
167. MIN. STAT. § 253A.07(15) (1971).
168. AIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-537 (1974).
169. Id. § 36-536(A).
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court at the time of the hearing with dispositional alternatives for placement.
170
Failure to discharge these duties may lead to a conviction for contempt.
It should be kept in mind that the enumerated duties represent a
legislative determination of the bare minimum which an attorney, either
appointed or retained, should do when representing a client facing commitment. Seemingly, not only may failure to discharge these duties be punishable as contumacious conduct, but it may also create a rebuttable, if not an
irrebutable, presumption of ineffective assistance of counsel. The only aspect
of effective assistance which the Arizona legislature ignored, and it properly
did so, is that involving ordinary advocacy skills such as the ability to present
evidence, to cross-examine expert witnesses, and to speak on behalf of the
client. Recognizing the need for advocates, the legislature apparently recognized that the imposition of such standards would make the pool of qualified
counsel small, and further recognized that it would be extremely difficult to
test for such skills.
At this writing it is too soon to tell how effectively Arizona's statutory
scheme for providing effective assistance of counsel is working. Specifically,
it would be interesting to learn how often, if at all, the judges are exercising
their contempt authority. Whatever the factual impact may be, the Arizona
Legislature has certainly taken great steps toward insuring that persons
facing commitment in Arizona will receive some semblance of effective
assistance of counsel.
In Lynch v. Baxley,' 71 after finding that proposed patients enjoyed a
right to appointed counsel prior to commitment, the court further reasoned
that such attorney must assume an adversarial role, be appointed in advance
to allow for adequate preparation, and be granted wide discovery rights.
Thus, one federal judge has perceived that certain minimal duties must be
required of appointed attorneys in the commitment context. However, the
real burden is on the legislatures to make the right to counsel truly
meaningful in this area of practice where few attorneys are experts. The fulltime advocate system may be the most effective method for providing
competent counsel, but it is not feasible for many states and localities.
Statutorily imposed duties may serve as a suitable alternative. Academic
72
research and suggestions helped ,to initiate legislative reform in Arizona;
therefore, all concerned practitioners and academicians should be encouraged to make similar recommendations in their home jurisdictions.
V.

CONCLUSION

In this Article I have dealt with the right to counsel, waiver thereof, and
effective assistance of counsel in the civil commitment process. What can be
concluded from this inquiry is that neither judicial decisions nor statutory
170. Id. § 36-537(B).
171. 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
172. See Wexler & Scoville, Special Project, The Administration of Psychiatric lustice: Theory and Practice in Arizona, 13 ARIz. L. REV. 1, 56 (1971), in which the

authors suggested that various statutory duties be imposed. Most of the proposals of
Wexler and Scoville appear in ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-536 (1974).

1975]

CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS

provisions alone can cure the ills of the system as it presently operates in
many jurisdictions and localities. We must look to both the courts and the
legislatures for needed reforms.
First, a Supreme Court decision establishing a constitutional right to
appointed counsel for indigent persons facing involuntary civil commitment is
needed, and it can be readily based upon either a sixth amendment or
general due process theory. Only in this way can equity and uniformity in
the administration of psychiatric justice be fostered throughout all areas of
the United States.
Second, we need a procedural mechanism devised by the legislatures and
implemented by the courts which will insure that any alleged waiver of this
right is truly voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. In order for the proposed
patient to understand the legal nature of his right ,to counsel and to perceive
the advantages of legal representation, the appointed attorney should be
statutorily required to meet with his client initially to explain these things. If
waiver is then to be allowed, it should be only after the proposed patient's
refusal to allow counsel to continue in his representative capacity and the
presiding judge's inquiry as to the reasons for such a refusal.
Lastly, in those areas where volume, funds, and personnel are insufficient
to institute a full-time advocate system, statutorily imposed duties can serve
as an alternative for insuring that effective assistance of counsel will be
rendered to the proposed patient facing commitment. Admittedly, the need
for statutorily specifying such duties is an affront to the competency and
conscientiousness of the legal profession, but the results of research studies
belie the contention that appointed attorneys are, on the whole, competently
representing their clients in the civil commitment process. Thus, statutorily
required duties, and courts which will be vigilant over their faithful discharge
by the attorneys who appear therein, would seem to be a feasible and
necessary means of rectifying the situation.

